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REMARKS OF THE HON. SHIRLEY S.
ABRAHAMSON BEFORE THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
DECEMBER 13, 1996
HONORABLE SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON*
Good morning! I am Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court. I have been Chief Justice since
August of this year, having served as a justice of the court since
September 1976. I am pleased to participate in this second public
hearing of the ABA Commission on Separation of Powers and Ju-
dicial Independence and to join friends and colleagues in discuss-
ing judicial independence, a "core value" of our democratic society
and of our tripartite system of government.
The commission has established the following tasks as part of
its work on the issues of separation of powers and judicial inde-
pendence in the context of the federal system:
1. Review the different forms of judicial independence,
and
2. Explore the tension between judicial independence and
judicial accountability.
More specifically, today's hearing will focus on, as I understand
it, two areas of tension: the tension between the doctrine of sepa-
ration of powers and the interdependence of the three branches of
government, and the tension between judicial independence and
the public's concern for accountability. How can we maintain an
appropriate balance, and how can we resolve the tension between
these fundamental yet conflicting concepts? I have attempted to
keep your tasks in mind in preparing my remarks.
* Chief Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court.
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Before I begin, I want to give you a context, a framework, for my
remarks. As you know, each state has its own judicial system and
its own political and legal culture. I cannot speak about all state
court systems, only my own. My experience derives from the Wis-
consin court system, a state court system whose constitution gives
the power of self-administration to the judicial branch.
I also want to posit a working definition of judicial independence
as a context for my remarks. Scholars speak of two overlapping
types of judicial independence: institutional judicial indepen-
dence (sometimes referred to as branch independence) and indi-
vidual judicial independence (sometimes referred to as decisional
independence).
Institutional judicial independence, or branch independence,
embodies the concept that the judiciary as a separate branch of
government acts independently of the other two branches, without
legislative or executive control. Institutional judicial indepen-
dence includes the relationships among the branches of govern-
ment and is closely related to the doctrine of separation of powers.
Branch independence serves individual judicial independence.
Individual judicial independence, or decisional independence,
embodies the concept that individual judges decide cases fairly,
impartially and according to the facts and the law, not according
to whim, prejudice or fear, or the dictates of the legislature or ex-
ecutive, or the latest opinion poll.
The general consensus is, I believe, that judicial independence,
although difficult to define, is valuable in our system and that
threats to either branch or decisional independence are ultimately
threats to the rule of law.
I have organized my presentation into five parts. First I briefly
discuss the doctrine of separation of powers in Wisconsin, the in-
stitutional independence of the Wisconsin judiciary, and the inter-
locking relationship of the three branches of Wisconsin govern-
ment, particularly with respect to the budget process. Second, I
speak about the Wisconsin experience with individual judicial in-
dependence, specifically the election of judges. Third, I describe a
recently created Wisconsin State Bar Commission on the Judici-
ary as a Co-equal Branch of Government, which has been in the
forefront of discussing judicial independence in the state of Wis-
consin. Fourth, I review modes of interbranch communication and
the extent to which they implicate judicial independence concerns.
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And fifth, I conclude with a discussion of how Wisconsin's initia-
tives at the state level promote a partnership between the judici-
ary and the public and an examination of how court-community
relations implicate judicial independence concerns.
I. INSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Constitution implicitly provides for the separa-
tion of powers by vesting the state's legislative power in a bicam-
eral legislature, its executive power in a governor and its judicial
power in a unified court system. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
has recognized, however, that the terms judicial, legislative and
executive power are not self-defining and that the separation of
powers doctrine states the principle of shared, rather than com-
pletely separated powers. We have a system of separateness with
interdependence, autonomy with reciprocity. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has explained that "the Wisconsin Constitution
creates three separate coordinate branches of government, no
branch subordinate to the other, no branch to arrogate to itself
control over the other except as is provided by the constitution,
and no branch to exercise the power committed by the constitution
to another .... The doctrine envisions a government of separated
branches sharing certain powers."'
The Wisconsin Constitution, in addition to vesting judicial
power in a unified court system, expressly provides that the
supreme court shall have superintending and administrative au-
thority over all courts. Furthermore, the Wisconsin Constitution
declares that the chief justice shall be the administrative head of
the judicial system and shall exercise this administrative author-
ity pursuant to procedures adopted by the supreme court.
The Wisconsin Constitution thus recognizes the independence
of the supreme court in the administration of the courts. No simi-
lar provision exists in the Federal Constitution.
Although the Wisconsin Constitution gives the supreme court
superintending and administrative powers, it does not expressly
give the court procedural independence, that is, the authority to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure. These mat-
ters are addressed in a Wisconsin statute that can be traced back
1 State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Wis. 1982).
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to 1849 - the first statutes of the new state of Wisconsin. Accord-
ing to the statute, the supreme court "shall, by rules promulgated
by it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure"
in judicial proceedings in all courts. The court-adopted rules,
however, "shall not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive
rights of any litigant." The statute makes clear, however, that
"the right of the legislature to enact, modify or repeal statutes or
rules relating to pleading, practice or procedure" is not abridged.
Intrinsic to the separation of powers is the doctrine of the inher-
ent power of the judiciary. This doctrine is based on the principle
of necessity; courts must have certain powers to carry out their
functions as courts.
Our supreme court has described inherent powers as follows:
In order that any human agency may accomplish its purposes,
it is necessary that it possess power .... In order to accom-
plish the purposes for which they are created, courts must
also possess powers. From time immemorial, certain powers
have been conceded to courts because they are courts. Such
powers have been conceded because without them they could
neither maintain their dignity, transact their business, nor
accomplish the purposes of their existence. These powers are
called inherent powers.2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has had to determine the respec-
tive powers of the judiciary and the legislature when the issue has
been raised in the context of a constitutional challenge to specific
legislation on the grounds of violation of the separation of powers
doctrine or when a court's functioning has been threatened by the
action or inaction of a legislative or executive body.
For example, a legislative enactment setting time limits on
judges' decisions was struck down as impinging on the courts' core
zone of power.3 Similarly, legislatively enacted educational re-
quirements for guardians ad litem were found to violate the
court's exclusive power to regulate the legal profession.4 In an-
other case, the court found that the power to set attorney fees for
court-appointed guardians ad litem and special prosecutors was
shared between the legislature and the judiciary, but that legisla-
2 State v. Cannon, 221 N.W. 603, 603 (Wis. 1928).
3 In re Grady, 348 N.W.2d 559, 569 (Wis. 1984).
4 State ex rel. Fiedler v. Wisconsin Senate, 454 N.W.2d 770, 775 (Wis. 1990).
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tion in this regard could not unduly burden or substantially inter-
fere with the work of the courts.5 Our court has also held that a
state statute permitting a criminal defendant a peremptory right
to substitution of the judge assigned to hear the case was valid
because on the basis of the record the court could not conclude
that the statute materially impaired or practically defeated the
proper functioning of the judicial system.'
Recently, the court struck down as a violation of the separation
of powers doctrine legislation abrogating a judge's power to ap-
point counsel for anyone other than the child in abuse and neglect
cases.7 The court concluded that the legislature's elimination of a
trial court's power to appoint counsel unreasonably burdened and
substantially interfered with the court's powers.
The inherent power of the courts has been held to extend to the
retention of a court janitor in the face of an executive branch effort
to dismiss him;8 to the decision to remain in an old courthouse
when the county government ordered a move to inadequate facili-
ties;9 to a demand for payment for installation of a courtroom air
conditioner;' ° and to ordering the release of state funds to procure
an automated legal research system for the courts."
To summarize, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized
that each branch has a core zone of exclusive authority upon
which another branch may not intrude. The authority of the legis-
lature and judiciary may overlap in other areas and in these areas
the legislature is prohibited from unreasonably burdening or sub-
stantially interfering with the judicial branch.
The following introductory passage from a Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision summarizes the court's view of separation of pow-
ers in Wisconsin:
Each branch has a core zone of exclusive authority into which
the other branches may not intrude. "Great borderlands of
5 Friedrich v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 531 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Wis. 1995).
6 State v. Holmes, 315 N.W.2d 703, 724 (Wis. 1982).
7 Joni B. v. State, 549 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Wis. 1996).
8 In re Janitor of Supreme Court, 35 Wis. 410, 421 (Wis. 1874).
9 In re Court Room & Offices of Fifth Branch Circuit Court Milwaukee County, 134 N.W.
490, 495 (Wis. 1912).
10 State ex rel. Reynolds v. County Court of Kenosha County, 105 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Wis.
1960).
11 State ex rel. Moran v. Department of Admin., 307 N.W.2d 658, 662 (Wis. 1981).
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power" lie in the interstices among the branches' core zones of
exclusive authority....
When the powers of the legislative and judicial branches over-
lap, the court has declared that the legislature is prohibited
from unreasonably burdening or substantially interfering
with the judicial branch. This subtle balancing of shared
powers, coupled with the sparing demarcation of exclusive
powers, has enabled a deliberately unwieldy system of gov-
emnment to endure successfully for nearly 150 years....
If a statute falls within the judiciary's core zone of exclusive
authority, the court may abide by the statute if it furthers the
administration of justice, "as a matter of comity or courtesy
rather than as an acknowledgment of power." Thus the court
acknowledges the legislature's power to declare itself on ques-
tions relating to the general welfare and the court complies
with the legislature's declared policy as long as the policy aids
but does not obstruct "the court in its own exclusive sphere." 2
In recent years, concerns about the doctrines of separation of
powers and inherent powers have focused on the issue of funding
for the courts. The Wisconsin Constitution makes no express pro-
vision for funding the operations of the courts. The legislature,
under its authority to tax and spend, determines the appropria-
tion for the court system, subject to the governor's veto.
In Wisconsin, judicial branch budget requests are submitted to
executive budget officials for review and revision. Once so revised,
the courts' budget requests are incorporated into the governor's
budget for submission to the legislature.
Judges are concerned about the underfunding of the court sys-
tem. For example, the state has invested $16 million in a single
statewide computer system for the Wisconsin courts which has
served as a model for other states seeking electronic solutions to
information management problems. We need continuing, sub-
stantial funding to ensure the adequate maintenance of our elec-
tronic infrastructure, let alone pursue the new electronic initia-
tives necessary to sustain and enhance our effectiveness.
The bottom line is that if the courts are to operate effectively for
the public, the courts must be adequately funded. Along with the
legislature's power to tax and spend comes the responsibility to
12 Friedrich v. Circuit Court of Dane County, 531 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Wis. 1995) (citations
omitted).
[Vol. 12:69
REMARKS OF JUSTICE ABRAHAMSON
ensure that the courts, as a co-equal branch of government, have
sufficient funds to fulfill their responsibilities to the people of the
state. The legislature, in the exercise of its independent judgment
and careful scrutiny, should, in my opinion, give deference to the
funding needs of the judiciary, just as the judiciary, in its adjudi-
cative functions, gives deference to the legislative branch. To give
deference, of course, does not mean to rubber stamp.
Underfunding of the courts may stem in large part from a lack
of communication among the branches. Like the general public,
the legislative and executive branches may not be sufficiently fa-
miliar with the workings of the courts and thus may not fully ap-
preciate our funding needs.
We must communicate effectively with our co-equal branches if
we are to successfully plead our cause with them and avoid dam-
aging confrontations about funding. I shall address strategies for
such communication more fully in a later segment of this
presentation.
II. INDIVIDUAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN WISCONSIN
I turn now from institutional judicial independence to individ-
ual judicial independence, that is, decisional independence. In the
federal system, appointment of judges and life tenure during good
behavior are intended to safeguard decisional independence. But
appointment and life tenure are not part of many state court sys-
tems. In these states judges must stand for election, either in con-
tested races or retention elections.
For some, judicial elections are a significant threat to decisional
judicial independence. Critics of the elective system question
whether elected judges can remain objective when they are depen-
dent on certain groups or persons for support in election
campaigns.
Proponents of an elected judiciary believe that judges should be
accountable to the people for their legal skills and practical knowl-
edge, their effective and efficient administration of their case load,
their integrity, fidelity to law and judicial temperament. Propo-
nents of the elective system nevertheless believe that judges
should be impartial and independent.
There is no perfect selection system for judges. While elected
judges may face great pressures on their ability to be independent,
appointed judges are not free from outside pressures either in the
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selection process or thereafter. Neither system can claim a mo-
nopoly on good judges. The best system is the one that suits the
particular legal culture of the jurisdiction. And the best judges,
whatever the system, are those who resist threats to their deci-
sional independence.
An elected judiciary is a fundamental part of the framework of
Wisconsin state government. Under the Wisconsin Constitution
our justices and judges are elected by the people in nonpartisan
contested races.
Wisconsin Supreme Court justices serve ten-year terms, while
trial and appellate court judges serve six-year terms. Originally
appointed by a governor to fill a vacancy, I have stood for election
twice.
I wholeheartedly support an elected judiciary for the state of
Wisconsin, a state with a strong populist tradition. I also believe
that Wisconsin voters, for the most part, exercise their right to
elect judges in a sound manner. A Wisconsin voter is more likely
to vote - I believe and hope - on the basis of a judicial candidate's
qualities - her ability, fairness and independence - than on that
voter's agreement or disagreement with a judge's decision in a
particular case or a candidate's position on a particular issue.
Other states, with different political and legal cultures, have
opted to select judges through an appointive or retention election
system.
Many factors contribute to making the elective system (with all
its difficulties) work in Wisconsin. 13
Wisconsin is a middle-sized state, in terms of both geographical
size and population. In contrast to the 200 elected judges in Cook
County, Illinois, Wisconsin has about 250 judges in the entire
state. Nearly two-thirds of our counties have only one or two
judges. In our largest county, Milwaukee County, we now have 46
circuit court judges. Even in Milwaukee County, at most seven or
eight judges will be on the ballot at any one time. We have seven
supreme court justices who serve ten-year terms. Only one
supreme court justice is on the ballot at any given election.
Wisconsin judges are elected in nonpartisan spring elections in
which unfortunately only a small percentage of the eligible voters
13 This paragraph and the next two paragraphs were added to the statement by letter to
the commission in response to questions.
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participate. Nevertheless, the voters seem interested, involved
and informed. Wisconsin judges generally enjoy bipartisan sup-
port in elections, regardless of any past party affiliation of the
judge or the party of the governor who may have appointed the
judge. The costs of campaigning are increasing in Wisconsin but
they are still lower than those of judicial campaigns in other
states.
Underlying the debate about appointed versus elected judges is
a fundamental disagreement about the capacity of the voters to
choose wisely. But as Thomas Jefferson said, "I know no safe de-
pository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people them-
selves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise
their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it from them, but to inform their discretion."' 4
Rather than scuttling judicial elections because we fear voter
ignorance, we should capitalize on the judicial election as a vehicle
for voter education. It is disappointing, but true, that many know
little about the courts, yet public education about judicial candi-
dates and about the courts is, in my opinion, key to judicial
independence.
Judicial elections can and should serve to educate the public
about what we judges do on a daily basis, about case management,
court powers, the general principles underlying court decisions
and the core value of decisional independence. The public must
understand that judges' decisions are circumscribed by law, that a
judge's discretion is often very limited and that the law sometimes
requires decisions that are unpopular - even with the judge
herself.
We must explain to the public the difference between the policy-
making functions of the legislature and the adjudicatory function
of the courts. Following a recent speech, an unhappy citizen asked
me why judges released so many criminals from prison on parole;
he saw that as a flaw in the judicial system. My questioner - and
many others in the audience - were surprised to learn that the
parole system in Wisconsin is governed by statute and adminis-
tered by the Department of Corrections, an executive branch
agency, not by the judiciary.
14 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), reprinted in
JoHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 473 (1968).
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Yet despite the educational opportunities offered by judicial
elections, the elective process can prove troublesome. Election
campaigns, especially statewide campaigns, are labor intensive ef-
forts that take judges away from the primary task of judging.
Campaign behavior can erode public confidence in independence
and impartiality. Judicial candidates have been charged with be-
ing too aggressive in stating their views on legal and political mat-
ters and calling into question their future independence in a par-
ticular case or on particular issues.
The increased cost of judicial election campaigns has, in the
eyes of many, cast a shadow over the judiciary and adversely af-
fected the perception of judicial independence. Though judicial
campaign costs in Wisconsin are not nearly as high as those in
Ohio as described by Chief Justice Moyer at the last public hear-
ing, the costs of campaigning in Wisconsin have increased in the
last few years.
Again, the solution to problems of judicial campaigning in a
state like Wisconsin is not to scuttle judicial elections but to pro-
mote the development of clear and reasonable rules for judicial
campaign behavior including solicitation and acceptance of cam-
paign contributions. The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibits judicial candidates from making pledges or promises of
conduct in office; from making statements that commit or appear
to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or is-
sues that are likely to come before the court; and from knowingly
misrepresenting the identity, qualifications, present position or
other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent. Furthermore
candidates are forbidden to personally solicit or accept campaign
contributions or to personally solicit public statements of support.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court is in the process of appointing a
commission to propose rules to govern campaigns for judicial elec-
tions in Wisconsin.
There is no definitive answer to the underlying question: Are
elected judges less independent than those appointed with life
tenure?
On the basis of my experience in Wisconsin, I answer this ques-
tion in the negative. Elected judges, just like appointed judges,
are subject to pressures which threaten individual judicial inde-
pendence. United States District Court Judge William M.
Hoeveler has reported that "even though [appointed judges] have
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life tenure, we're human; don't ever think we're not subject to
outside pressures."15
Decisional independence, in my view, arises out of a judge's
training, oath of office and social and cultural conditioning. The
constraints on judges demand judicial independence. Because ju-
dicial independence is valued in our society, judges strive to live
up to this norm. In sum, I believe that judicial independence is a
matter of the character of the individual judge. The quality of the
individual, not the selection process, determines decisional
independence.
III. WISCONSIN STATE BAR COMMISSION ON THE JUDICIARY AS A
CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
I turn now to the Wisconsin State Bar Commission on the Judi-
ciary as a Co-Equal Branch of Government, a 33-member panel
appointed by then State Bar President-elect David Saichek in Au-
gust 1995. The commission is composed of lawyers, non-lawyers,
judges, and representatives of the legislative and executive
branches. It is co-chaired by President Saichek and my colleague
on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Justice Jon P. Wilcox. The
members are organized into five committees: Court-Community
Collaboration, Interbranch Relations, Court Accountability, Fund-
ing and Resources, and Research.
The commission has two stated purposes:
1. To "research the historical and current framework of the
separation of powers doctrine"; and
2. To "explore means by which the courts can properly main-
tain their independence while cooperating with other
branches of government toward the goal of serving the citi-
zens of Wisconsin with basic good government."
In the words of State Bar President David Saichek, the commis-
sion is addressing the following questions:
Is the judiciary strong and independent? Is it using its re-
sources wisely and efficiently? Is it accountable to the citi-
zens? Is it funded sufficiently to perform its proper role as a
coordinate branch of government? Or, is the judiciary treated
15 Panel, What is Judicial Independence? Views from the Public, the Press, the Profes-
sion, and the Politicians, 80 JuDIcATUREu 73, 75 (1996).
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like a powerless relative who must beg for sustenance at the
sufferance of the other branches of government? What pow-
ers does the judiciary have to determine its own fate?16
Having read the transcript of your October 11th public hearing, I
know these questions are familiar to you.
The Wisconsin commission has conducted public hearings in
five cities across the state soliciting the views of judges, state bar
members, state and local legislators, court staff, court users and
the public. Draft reports of the several committees will be circu-
lated for public comment in January 1997, and the commission
expects to present its final report to the State Bar Board of Gover-
nors in April 1997.
Although I am unable to present the commission's findings to
you today, I can say that the Court Accountability Committee will
make a preliminary recommendation that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court create a task force on the quality of the court system to con-
sider a methodology for judicial assessment using the Trial Court
Performance Standards and Measurement System developed by
the National Center for State Courts. In addition, several prelimi-
nary recommendations from the Court-Community Collaboration
Committee are similar to suggestions I make later in my remarks
about a court-community coalition for justice.
I would be happy to forward copies of the drafts submitted for
public comment and the final report of the commission as they be-
come available.
IV. INTERBRANCH RELATIONS
I turn now to the issue of interbranch communication and the
extent to which it implicates judicial independence concerns.
In speaking about relations and communications between the
judiciary and the legislature, I have in the past referred to the
song "Shall We Dance?" from the musical The King and I. The
song and the scene of Anna (an English school teacher) teaching
the King of Siam to dance point out that although Anna and the
King had significant and conspicuous differences, the two had
enough in common to learn from one another and to work together
toward a single purpose. So, too, the legislature and the judiciary
16 David Saichek, President's Perspective, Wis. LAw., Oct. 1996, at 4.
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who "move in proud and silent isolation"17 can learn to under-
stand each other, communicate with each other and work more
effectively together for the public good.
In simple terms, the goal of interbranch communication is that
the judicial and legislative branches listen to and learn from each
other so that we can better serve the people. The legislature and
judiciary are important to each other. This interdependence gives
both branches a basis for communication.
Every day the judiciary sees the importance of the legislature to
the functioning of the courts. The legislature creates substantive
law which can increase, decrease or change the business of the
courts. The quality of legislative drafting affects our cases, many
of which involve statutory interpretation. The legislature estab-
lishes procedural rules which affect the operation of the courts,
sometimes in unforeseen ways. The legislature, through the
budget process, funds court operations. And on a more personal
level, the legislature sets the working conditions of judges, includ-
ing salary, benefits and retirement.
So, too, is the judiciary important to the legislative function. As
Judge Abner J. Mikva has observed, courts are an integral part of
the legislative process. If we consider the legislative process as a
continuum, the judiciary is at the far end of that continuum as we
interpret and act on legislative enactments. I have heard many a
legislator say, "Third branch? Nonsense! The courts are the only
branch. The legislature can pass all the laws it likes. Then you
interpret them, and it's nothing like the legislature intended, or
you strike them down as unconstitutional."
The framers of both the Federal and Wisconsin Constitutions
clearly envisioned the interdependence as well as the indepen-
dence of the branches of government. A legislative-judicial part-
nership rests by constitutional design on an uneasy footing. Some
of the tension between the branches is a healthy part of our sys-
tem of separation of powers and checks and balances. Neverthe-
less, both judges and legislators see some unhealthy barriers to
interbranch communication.
One barrier is that legislators and judges may have ingrained
negative attitudes about each other. In my home state when the
judicial branch receives a memorandum from the legislative or ex-
17 Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REv. 113, 125 (1921).
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ecutive branch, it is usually addressed to "all agencies," as if the
judicial branch is simply another executive entity. It is hard for
many judges to get beyond this first line without getting angry.
By the same token, if you want to raise the hackles of a legislator
just whisper the words "inherent powers of the judiciary," or "judi-
cial independence."
A second barrier is that the two branches have limited knowl-
edge of each other's institutional roles and each other's methods of
working.
In addition to the negative attitudes and lack of information
that keep us apart, a number of other more troubling obstacles
arise when we begin to consider interbranch communication.
Some would argue that interbranch communication is not permis-
sible. Some judges interpret their constitutional role as a barrier
to their participation in any manner in the legislative process.
They view judges who participate in legislative matters as walk-
ing violations of the separation of powers doctrine.
Legislators do not universally welcome judges in the legislative
process. Some legislators express resentment toward judges' in-
cursions into their domain and view judges' attempts to communi-
cate about proposed legislation as an interference with legislative
independence.
For those who believe that interbranch communication is per-
missible and desirable, the lack of clear guidelines for judges' ex-
trajudicial activity in the legislative process presents an obstacle.
For example, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Canon 4B,
C) permits judges to participate in extrajudicial activities concern-
ing "the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice."
The overriding rule is that a judge must conduct all extrajudicial
activities in a manner that will not cast doubt on the judge's ca-
pacity to act impartially as a judge, demean the judicial office, or
interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. Still the
exact rules of judicial conduct - the proper steps for this legisla-
tive-judicial dance - need further refining.
Although many see no constitutional or ethical barriers to inter-
branch communication and indeed believe that interbranch inter-
action is necessary and desirable, it is generally acknowledged
that there are prudential concerns; caution is necessary. Legisla-
tive activity enmeshes a judge in partisan politics and can tarnish
the judiciary's reputation. Participation in legislative matters
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may give the appearance that a judge has prejudged an issue or
statute which may later come before the court, so as to necessitate
the judge's disqualification. If there is any consensus, it is that
judicial communication with the legislature must be conducted
with minimal damage to institutional credibility and reputation.
Another troubling aspect of interbranch communication is de-
termining whether a judge is approaching the legislature as a
judge or as an individual who happens to be a judge. A judge
wears several hats; he or she may speak for the institutional con-
cerns of the judicial branch, for the personal interests of judges as
a group or as an individual citizen expressing individual policy
views. As former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde has
commented, what is important is to maintain clear distinctions
about the judge's role.' 8 But that is often easier said than done.
Beyond the different roles of the judge, and perhaps more im-
portant, is who decides the position of the judicial branch on a par-
ticular issue. If all the judges do not agree with the official posi-
tion, can a dissenting judge present a minority view? Under what
circumstances?
From the foregoing discussion one might conclude that judges
and legislators do not communicate, but merely agonize about
whether and how to do so. On the contrary, given their shared
interest in improving the law and the administration of justice,
the two branches have tried many ways of working more closely
together on their common enterprise.
As I have written before, I join Robert Katzmann in his wise
counsel that if communication between the two branches is to be
improved and routinized without impinging on the prerogatives
and integrity of either branch, we must discuss and evaluate the
communication devices that have been tried. We must also con-
tinue our efforts to discover new devices.
The most obvious way in which the judiciary communicates is
through judicial opinions. In my experience, however, this com-
munication device is limited in the legislative arena. Legislators
simply do not read our opinions. Legislators most often learn
about our opinions from their constituents or from the media. Of
course in fairness I acknowledge that judges are frequently una-
18 Hans Linde, Observations of a State Court Judge, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: To-
WARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 128 (R. Katzmann ed., 1988).
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ware of the legislature's primary communications with us: the
bills they enact in response to opinions of the court.
A second form of judicial communication with the legislature is
the Chief Justice's State of the Judiciary address. In Wisconsin
this address is delivered annually to fellow judges at the state ju-
dicial conference. The judges are the target audience, but the
written address is also disseminated to the executive and legisla-
tive branches. In other states, the State of the Judiciary address
is delivered by the Chief Justice to an open session of the legisla-
ture. Such direct communication is probably more effective.
Since some of the barriers to effective interbranch communica-
tion result from lack of knowledge about and understanding of the
other branches' perspectives and problems, programs that educate
members of each branch about the other branches can be instru-
mental in opening the door to communication.
For example, the legislature might invite judges to participate
in orientation sessions for new legislators, describing for them the
work of the judicial branch. Likewise, the judiciary might invite
legislators to orientation sessions for new judges, or to judicial
conferences.
In Wisconsin, we have designed a program to have legislators
observe the courts in action. We call it the Judicial Ride-Along
Program. (It's really a sit-along, but that doesn't sound quite as
exciting.) Through the Ride-Along program, we invite legislators
from each of the counties to sit alongside a trial court judge for
half a day, observing how the judge handles the caseload and then
evaluating the experience. So far about 80 legislators across the
state have participated in this program. Many of them have re-
ported a new appreciation for some things judges have been say-
ing for many years: our dispositional alternatives are limited and
our resources are slim. Our hope is that the legislators translate
their learning experience into effective legislation and public
policy.
Many kinds of official and two-way communication devices have
also been tried: Some states include legislators in the judiciary's
long-range planning process; through this involvement legislators
realize that they have a stake in the courts. Other states employ
joint study commissions and task forces comprised of representa-
tives from the three branches, as well as the public. Regular state
or regional conferences involving legislators and judges can for-
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malize a mechanism for regular communication between the two
groups. Legislatures may appoint liaisons to the judiciary; former
legislators who become judges may act as liaisons to the
legislature.
Attaching judicial impact statements to proposed legislation to
measure the effect of legislation on the business of the courts is
also being used in some jurisdictions.
More informal methods of interbranch communication are also
possible. For example, in some states the chief justice holds an
annual reception for legislative leaders.
In Wisconsin, we have created an informal discussion group
composed of about five legislators, five executive branch officials
and five judges - trial and appellate. The group meets several
times each year to discuss matters of mutual interest to the three
branches. For example, in our first meeting we talked about the
Governor's new task force on sentencing alternatives; the second
meeting was devoted to a demonstration of the courts' automation
program; the third featured an explanation of the executive
budget process. An outgrowth of this informal discussion group
has been a unique partnership between the executive and judicial
branches of government by which the executive branch is making
use of the judicial system's recognized expertise in automated sys-
tems implementation.
An additional or alternative option to direct communication be-
tween the branches of government is the use of intermediaries.
Administrative offices of the court can serve this purpose, as can
professional organizations such as bar associations.
The subject of interbranch relations will continue to be a diffi-
cult one; it is a work in progress. We know intuitively that good
interbranch relations can benefit the three branches of govern-
ment and the people, but the nuts and bolts of forging positive
relationships often escape us.
So, shall we dance? Sometimes. But let's watch out for each
others' toes.
V. A COURT-COMMUNITY COALITION FOR JUSTICE
I conclude with Wisconsin's initiatives to promote a partnership
between the judiciary and the public and a discussion of how
court-community relations implicate judicial independence
concerns.
1996]
86 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
The power of the courts lies in the confidence and trust of the
people. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted, "[w]e must never
forget that the only real source of power we as judges can tap is
the respect of the people." 19 We, the judges, must be vigilant to
retain that public confidence.
Wisconsin is fortunate that public confidence in the judiciary re-
mains high. In my non-scientific, non-random sampling of more
than 400 members of service clubs in Wisconsin I am pleased to
report that over 98% of the respondents expressed confidence in
Wisconsin judges, believing them to be generally honest and ethi-
cal. In response to the question "what are the greatest assets or
strengths in our judicial system?" many answered "impartiality,"
"fairness" and "judicial independence." We cannot, however, be
too sanguine. Many were critical of "delays," "costs" and "frivolous
litigation."
Earning the people's confidence in and respect for the judiciary's
work is a many-faceted process. But two things are critical: we
must have the people's understanding and we must understand
the people.
One of the goals of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's efforts re-
garding judicial independence is to foster court-community collab-
oration, to create a true partnership for justice. This partnership
has two elements: (1) Outreach - the judiciary working with citi-
zens to help them become better informed about the work of the
courts and to show them the value of judicial independence; and
(2) Input - direct public involvement in the work of the justice
system.
Because the judiciary is the least understood of the three
branches of government, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has nu-
merous outreach programs to educate the public including a
speakers bureau, court visitors' guides, forums and programs for
journalists and journalism students, and an electronic bulletin
board for easy access to appellate judicial opinions. I have de-
scribed these programs in a recent article and shall not elaborate
on them here.2 °
A very successful, recently organized supreme court and bar
program called "Court with Class" has invited high school stu-
19 CHI. TRB., Aug. 15, 1981.
20 Shirley S. Abrahamson, A True Partnership for Justice, 80 JUDICATURE 6 (1996).
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dents from every public and private school in the state to come
watch a supreme court oral argument and meet with a justice over
the noon hour. Response has been overwhelming and we are now
booking classes into 1998.
In speaking with the public, we also listen to the public's con-
cerns, criticisms and suggestions. In this connection, we have de-
veloped several programs to encourage the public to assist the op-
erations of the courts.
One ongoing project is to increase the use of volunteers in the
court system. We are now creating a database of existing trial
court volunteer programs to be used as a resource for replication
of volunteer projects throughout the state.
Whether elected or appointed, judges need to see ourselves as
accountable to litigants, the bar and all who are consumers of our
services. Judges should look at our roles from the perspective of
those who appear before us and of the entire community we serve.
Consumers' impressions of the system of justice are all important
- whether litigants and lawyers are treated fairly and with re-
spect, whether claims are promptly and efficiently resolved ac-
cording to the law, whether, in short, our courts are seen as this
society's chosen forum for resolving disputes and achieving jus-
tice. Considering the users of the system and increasing their op-
portunities for involvement in the courts does not impede judicial
independence. On the contrary, only with public support for an
independent judiciary is the judiciary truly independent.
In conclusion, I want to thank the commission for the opportu-
nity to present one state judge's views on judicial independence.
While I understand that your mandate is limited to judicial inde-
pendence in the federal system, I applaud your including state ex-
perience in your hearings.
I look forward to the commission's report at the conclusion of
your work.
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